Salvation ex Nihilo
By Ryan Ries


The title of this article is purposely facetious. A bit of an attention-grabber, if you will. Be that as it may, the title's real purpose is to open a discussion, not about the philosophy of nihilism in general, but specifically about how it applies to our lives. The validity of nihilistic philosophical conclusions is still a much discussed issue. If you'd like to know more about what nihilism is first, I recommend hitting up Wikipedia, then coming back. The reason I want to talk specifically about how nihilism affects our daily lives, is because that is the very thing that most people will tell you that nihilism, as well as most other comprehensive philosophies, will never do.

For many people, nihilism is simply the logical end to their line of reasoning, and for some of these people their conclusions cause a great deal of emotional distress. Most of us believe that the purpose of philosophy is not merely to find the truth, but to find a way of living with the truths we find - of accepting those truths and incorporating them into our day-to-day lives. We all study philosophy in our own ways and for our own reasons, and in the heart of every philosopher out there is a burning question that drives them, and today, it is a question of value.

Everyone asks themselves at some point "What is the meaning of life?" Nagel's analysis of this question suggests that in order for a life to be meaningful, it must have both a purpose and a value. One aspect of nihilism is that value does not exist in objective terms, which has obvious implications on the question of "the meaning of life." In general we tend to associate nihilism with emotions of despair, depression and the like. What I want to suggest is that nihilism presents its own kind of salvation, and that to react to the valuelessness of the world with despair is inconsistent.

Our emotional responses to the phenomenon of life are, to put it in simple terms, governed by our evaluation of those phenomenon. Those events/thoughts we view as bad tend to produce negative emotions, those which we view as good produce positive emotions. Why then, would an individual who really subscribes to nihilism react with despair or depression, when the axiom of nihilism can, by definition, have neither positive or negative value?

In my personal experience of wrestling with this problem, I went through the customary stage of angst associated with it. Then I realized, seeing as nihilism itself ought not to be the cause of these emotions, it might be something else relating to the discovery. To cut to the kernel of what I now believe is the cause of this despair: it is not nihilism that produces unhappiness, it is our expectation that things should be otherwise.

Where did this expectation come from? I think one plausible explanation can come from our evolutionary history. Obviously there are certain evolutionary mechanics behind why our minds are so bound to think of the world in terms of value: it allows us to navigate the world, to survive and to reproduce. Certainly there are social influences as well, almost from birth we are raised to conform to our society's values.

Is it possible to let go of one's system of value, and indeed the entire concept of value, and learn to make peace with that fact? Why can't a nihilist admit that nothing truly matters, and that they are a moist pile of highly organized matter acting on ultimately meaningless impulse, and at the same time pick chocolate ice cream over vanilla? How can one say that "nothing matters," yet still duck when someone throws a baseball at their head?

When we look up at the stars at night, and see how infinitesimally small we are, it is as if we have been given a piece of irrefutable evidence that nothing we can accomplish on this planet is of any real significance, but what feeling does such a sight elicit within us? Despair? I think not! To me it feels as if a huge weight has been lifted off of my shoulders - there is no good, no bad, there just is - and I have nothing to worry about! Could it be that our values are actually burdening us with unnecessary imprisonment?



Some of you of you might try to argue that a nihilist would be unrestrained in behaving unethically. This may be true in that, for a nihilist there are no bad actions - however, when we look at what is termed unethical behavior, it is often motivated by the very superficial values that would have been left behind by the nihilist, such as money, power, or sex. Nihilism is not the same as hedonism. Moreover, generally I feel that unethical behavior is (almost) always based on a kind of selfishness - an over-valuation of ones own interests when compared to those of others. Some of you might try to argue that this "salvation" that is achieved through nihilism, would of course have no value in itself. Obviously this is an implication of nihilist thought - but it does not seem impossible for a nihilist to make choices. I can choose peace of mind over its antithesis while acknowledging that neither has inherent value.

Why would I make such a choice?

Demanding that nihilism find a way to criticize the actions or values of others - like genocide - is pretty weak, considering that the actions themselves are overwhelmingly driven by moralist fervor. Where would the Third Reich have gone if people didn't believe in a greater purpose? I don't desire it, I find the outcome repulsive, and I find their reasoning for it to be retarded. My inability to denounce it at a cosmic level somehow makes my position worse than anyone else's?

I don't think Nietzsche argued that there were "No Real Values", he just used a genealogical method to raise suspicion of those values and how they came to be. What he was afraid of was that once people understood the genealogical method, and found out the origin of their beliefs (that the origin of truths were lies, that morality was rooted in immorality), that most people would come to believe in nothing, and that was his greatest fear. What he hoped for was that people would overcome this belief in nothing, and would create new and radical autonomous subjectivities.